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Abstract—Adversaries are increasingly motivated to spend energy trying to evade automatic malware detection tools. Dynamic
analysis examines the behavioural trace of malware, which is difficult to obfuscate, but the time required for dynamic analysis means it
is not typically used in practice for endpoint protection but rather as an analysis tool. This paper presents a run-time model to detect
malicious processes and automatically kill them as they run on a real endpoint in use. This approach enables dynamic analysis to be
used to prevent harm to the endpoint, rather than to analyse the cause of damage after the event. Run-time detection introduces the
risk of malicious damage to the endpoint and necessitates that malicious processes are detected and killed as early as possible to
minimise the opportunities for damage to take place. A distilled machine learning model is used to improve inference speed whilst
benefiting from the parameters learned by larger, more computationally intensive model. This paper is the first to focus on tangible
benefits of process killing to the user, showing that the distilled model is able to prevent 86.34% of files being corrupted by ransomware
whilst maintaining a low false positive rate for unseen benignware of 4.72%.
Index Terms—malware detection, machine learning, recurrent neural network, distillation, automation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Malicious software (malware) evolves rapidly both to
evade detection and take advantage of new vulnerabilities.
In the first half of 2019, 3.6 new malware samples appeared
each second according to AV-TEST, a security research in-
stitute [1]. Automatic detection techniques are necessary to
cope with the rate at which new malware samples are being
created as the expert human resources required to analyse
this volume of malware are limited. Automatic detection
uses data to make decisions and this data can be static or
dynamic. Dynamic data is less vulnerable to obfuscation
techniques [2] and analysis of this data can be conducted
offline or at run-time (online). Offline dynamic data has
been used to train machine learning models, achieving
>95% detection accuracy (e.g. [3], [4], [5]) using the full
post-execution traces of software. Dynamic models are not,
however, widely used for endpoint protection as they take
much longer to record the execution trace and reach a
decision.
Detection: Online vs. Offline. Online (run-time) mal-
ware detection provides real-time analysis whilst a sample
executes, whereas offline detection first collects data, then
analyses this data. Real-time analysis can prevent problems
rather than simply detecting that they have occurred after
the fact. In the same way that self-driving cars need to
detect a “STOP” sign as early as possible (rather than 10
minutes after it has passed) in order to mitigate the chances
of a road accident, online malware detection can detect
malware before the malicious payload is delivered. Online
detection of malicious software is more challenging than
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offline detection because typically online detection must use
a partial execution trace rather than the full behavioural
footprint. In order to protect the machine we can assume
that the earlier a malicious process is detected and killed, the
more likely we are to have prevented damage to the victim
machine/network. This means making decisions based on
short behavioural traces. Our previous work [6] found that
short offline behavioural traces can still give high detection
accuracy for offline detection, but this used machine-level
data and was not able to identify the specific malicious
processes that needed to be killed to mitigate damage to
the endpoint. It is not feasible that a user will wait for the
entire execution trace, which can take several minutes to
deliver a verdict, therefore, we propose an online run-time
behavioural detection tool to kill malware as early as possi-
ble with a goal to mitigate harm. Previous work on process
killing [7] has used behavioural traces of 5 to 10 minutes,
but this is sufficient time for malware to cause damage. One
security vendor has found that Chimera ransomware can
encrypt 70 MB worth of files (stored in 1,000 documents)
in 18 seconds [8]. This is the first paper, to the best of our
knowledge, to try and detect and kill malicious processes
with a goal to mitigate damage to the target endpoint.
Malicious application vs. malicious process detection.
Killing a malicious sample amounts to killing the processes
underlying that application. Previous malware detection
research collects behavioural data for the entire (virtual) ma-
chine whilst a single application executes. However, on an
endpoint in use it is less trivial to distinguish the malicious
and benign applications by observing the behaviours of the
machine alone - given aggregation of many applications
into behavioural traces. Rather, it is necessary to look at the
behaviours of the individual processes. This is more chal-
lenging than application-level detection because a model is
only able to observe partial components of the behavioural
trace in each constituent process. Sun et al. [7] present the
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2only previous work to attempt process-level detection. The
authors use API call sequences but find that the online API
hooking slows detection and is therefore unsuited to real-
time early detection and process killing. In this paper we
use machine activity metrics (e.g. CPU use, memory use,
network traffic metrics) to capture process-level behaviour
as these can quickly be extracted at detection time to enable
early process killing.
Two fundamental challenges for run-time malicious pro-
cess detection and automated process killing are:
(i) The false positive rate is prone to increase as a single
false positive detection during several hours of true neg-
ative detections will terminate that process (and its child
processes) this can mean work being lost, interruption to
business processes and other significant consequences for
the user. Previous malware detection models cannot empha-
sise the impact of a false positive. We develop a modified
loss function inspired by reinforcement learning to teach a
recurrent neural network (RNN) the impact of automatic
process killing following a positive detection.
(ii) The model needs to be quick enough at killing
malicious processes to prevent damage and thus justify the
use of run-time detection. We propose distilling the learning
of the RNN into an algorithm with a shorter inference speed,
a Random Forest. The distilled model benefits from the
RNN’s learning and requires less data collection, storage
and inference time during execution than the RNN thus
allowing for a faster response.
This paper contributes to the field of online malware
detection in the following ways:
• This is the first paper, as far as we are aware, to ad-
dress run-time process killing looking at the tangible
impact on the victim endpoint machine.
• A novel loss function and distilled model for ma-
licious process detection is presented to improve in-
ference speed and response time. Previous work ( [7],
[9]) has used a two-stage model with a lightweight
model sending suspicious processes to a more com-
putationally intensive model. This approach is vul-
nerable to getting stuck in an infinite loop of back-
and-forth between the two models, thus consuming
as much processing power as if the intensive model
were running constantly.
• The model is judged using a realistic environment
based on a typical laptop with between 2 and 35
applications running simultaneously (up to 95 simul-
taneous processes), this limited processing capability
and scale of execution has not previously been inves-
tigated for run-time malware detection.
The following paper will first present related work in
Section 2. The proposed model is presented in Section 3.
In Section 4 three models are compared: first an offline
malware process detection model using the entire execution
trace (4.2), second an online run-time model trained with a
modified loss function using automated process killing (4.3),
and third, a distilled Random Forest model for improved
inference speed (4.4). Finally a live test is conducted with
ransomware to demonstrate the tangible benefits of the
distilled model (4.5) followed by a discussion of future work
(Section 5) and conclusions (Section 6)
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Malware detection using dynamic behaviours
The data used to distinguish malicious and benign software
can be either static or dynamic. Static detection uses data ex-
tracted directly from the code of a malware sample, whereas
dynamic data records the behavioural traces of malware as
it executes. Traditional antivirus techniques create static sig-
natures from known malware and use these to distinguish
malicious and benign files. These signatures will not capture
new malware variants (zero-days) and can be bypassed by
simple obfuscation techniques to disguise even known vari-
ants [10]. More recently machine learning models trained on
static data have shown good detection accuracy, e.g. Chen
et. al. [11] achieved 96% detection accuracy using statically-
extracted sequences of API calls to train a Random Forest
model. However, in direct comparison with dynamic data,
static data performed less well and did not even improve
accuracy when used to augment dynamic datasets [2]. Ad-
versarial samples present an additional emerging concern
to static machine learning models. Adversarial samples are
specifically crafted to cause machine learning models to
misclassify. Grosse et al. [12] and Kolsnaji et al. [13] demon-
strated that static malware detection models achieving over
90% detection accuracy could be thwarted by injecting code
or simply altering the padded code at the end of a compiled
binary respectively.
Dynamic behavioural data is more difficult to obfus-
cate as it is generated by the malware carrying out its
functionality. Removing this data is equivalent to removing
the functionality, which may be essential to the malicious
payload. Again machine learning models have been used to
draw out patterns between malicious and benign software
using dynamic data. Various dynamic data can be collected
to describe malware behaviour. The most commonly used
data are API calls made to the operating system, typically
recorded in short sequences or by frequency of occurrence.
Huang and Stokes’s research [3] reports the highest accuracy
in recent malware detection literature with a very large
dataset of more than 6 million samples to achieve an accu-
rate detection rate of 99.64% using a neural network trained
on the input parameters passed to API calls and the co-
occurrence of API calls. Other dynamic data sources include
dynamic opcode sequences (e.g. Carlin et al. [14] achieve
99.04% using a Random Forest), hardware performance
counters (e.g. Sayadi [15] achieve 94% on Linux/Ubuntu
malware using a decision tree), and machine activity metrics
(e.g. Burnap et al. [16] achieve 94% using a self-organising
map). Recently, Rhode et al. [17] demonstrated the robust-
ness of machine activity metrics over API calls in detecting
malware collected from different sources.
Dynamic detection is more difficult to obfuscate but
typically the time taken to collect data is several minutes,
making it less attractive for endpoint detection systems.
Some progress has been made on early detection of mal-
ware. For instance, Rhode et al. [6] were able to detect
malware with 94% accuracy within 5 seconds of executions.
However, as a sandbox-based method, malware which is
inactive for the first 5 seconds is unlikely to be detected
with this approach.
3Moreover, the majority of dynamic malware detection
papers use virtualised environments to collect data. Sophis-
ticated malware can detect when it is running in a virtual
machine and behave differently under these conditions [18].
The only way to ensure that the behaviour being observed
during execution is the same behaviour as would occur on
a victim endpoint is to either perfectly mimic the victim
environment, which could be financially or practically im-
possible if there are a variety of endpoints being detected,
or to collect data from the victim endpoint itself. This paper
examines the possibility of a run-time malware detection
with an automated response to malware being detected.
2.2 Run-time malicious process detection
Run-time malware detection uses dynamic data collected
as the malware executes on the target endpoint. In transi-
tioning from a virtual machine to a machine in use, three
additional challenges appear for malware detection. The
first is that a user is likely to be interacting with the ma-
chine so the malware detection model needs to be able to
distinguish malicious and benign behaviours. The second is
that the malware is now running on a networked machine
with potentially sensitive data that could be compromised.
Third, detection models need to be lightweight to minimise
the chances of disruption to benign use.
Run-time detection on an endpoint in use requires us
to distinguish between malware and benignware that are
running simultaneously. Offline malware detection research
will typically execute malware and benignware one-by-one
in a virtual environment and monitor the behaviour on the
virtual machine. This is not possible for run-time detec-
tion. The individual processes need to be examined instead
because looking at behaviour on the overall machine will
include data generated by both malicious and benign pro-
cesses. Moreover we want to isolate the malicious processes
so that they can be automatically blocked or investigated
further.
The first challenge to detect malicious processes has only
previously been addressed by Sun et al. [7] using sequential
API call data. The authors execute up to 5 benign and ma-
licious programs simultaneously achieving 87% detection
accuracy after 5 minutes of execution and 91% accuracy after
10 minutes of execution.
The second challenge posed by the risk that malware
executes on the endpoint has not been directly addressed
by previous work. Some work has looked at early-stage
tun-time detection. Das et al. [19] used an FPGA as part
of a hybrid hardware-software approach to detect malicious
Linux applications using system API calls which are then
classified using a multilayer perceptron. Their model was
able to detect 46% of malware within the first 30% of its
execution with a false-positive rate of 2% in offline testing.
These findings however were not tested with multiple be-
nign and malicious programs running simultaneously and
do not explain the impact of detecting 46% of malware
within 30% of its execution trace in terms of benefits to a
user or the endpoint being protected.
The third challenge (to minimise user disruption) can
be linked to the second challenge (to bring about early
detection). Some previous work has proposed hardware
based detection for lightweight monitoring. Syadi et al. [15]
use high performance counters (HPC) as features to train
ensemble learning algorithms and scored 0.94 AUC using
a dataset of 100 malicious and 100 benign Linux software
samples. Ozsoy et al. [20] use low-level architectural events
to train a multilayer perceptron on the more widely used
[21] (and attacked) Windows operating system. The model
was able to detect 94% of malware with a false positive rate
of 7% using partial execution traces of 10,000 committed in-
structions. The hardware based detection models however,
are less portable than software-based systems due to the
ability for the same operating system to run on a variety of
hardware configurations.
Both Sun et al. [7] and Yuan [9] propose two-stage
models to address the need for lightweight computation.
The first stage comprises a lightweight ML model such as
a Random Forest to alert suspicious processes, the second
being a deep learning model which is more accurate but
more computationally intensive to run. Two-stage models,
as Sun et al. [7] note, can get stuck in an infinite loop of anal-
ysis in which the first model flags a process as suspicious
but the second model deems it benign and this labelling
continues repeatedly. This paper proposes using a distilled
lightweight model trained on the outputs of an accurate but
computationally intensive model to reduce computational
complexity and potentially improve detection accuracy.
2.3 Distillation for malware detection
Distillation describes the process of training a new model on
the outputs of another trained (set of) model(s). It was first
proposed by Hinton et al. [22] to capture the benefits of an
ensemble of models in a more computationally lightweight
model, however, it has also been used as a defence against
the development of adversarial samples for fooling machine
learning models [23]. Celik and McDaniel [24] applied dis-
tillation to a number of security datasets including user
face authentication and malware family classification to
capture the knowledge of a model that had been exposed to
“privileged” data. “Privileged” data is data that is expensive
or slow to generate and so will not be available during run-
time. We use the finding of Celik and McDaniel’s work [24]
to train a Random Forest on a short snapshot of behaviour
but benefiting from a recurrent neural network which has
been trained by observing a longer window of behavioural
data.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
In this paper we attempt to address the problems posed
by virtual-machine detecting, using endpoint monitoring
of processes with automatic killing for those deemed ma-
licious. Examining malicious behaviour on a live endpoint
requires process-level monitoring in order to distinguish
between behaviours arising from benign and malicious ap-
plications. There are a number of significant challenges in
trying to detect and kill malicious processes in real-time
by comparison with behavioural malware detection in a
sandbox using the entire execution trace. The two most
significant challenges are:
C1 False positives have worse consequences and are
more likely to occur
4Fig. 1. Proposed model during training
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Fig. 2. Proposed model at inference
A false positive in real-time detection with process
killing, potentially results in a benign process being
terminated whilst in use. This results in a worse user
experience than not permitting a benign program
to run in the first place as work-in-progress could
be lost, business processes interrupted, etc. False
positives are also more likely because the model
must make its decisions based on partial execution
traces - it cannot wait for the program to finish
before classification otherwise all malware would
succeed in executing. If the model believes a pro-
gram is benign once in one thousand predictions, it
is achieving 99.9% accuracy but a single malicious
prediction will result in the process being killed and
therefore a false positive.
C2 Malicious processes need to be killed as early as
possible The model should kill malicious processes
as soon as possible to reduce the chance of damage
taking place. This places restrictions on the time that
can be taken for data collection, data preprocessing
and model inference. Typically a model will perform
better with more data, such as a longer window
of execution trace prior to classification, but to im-
prove the response speed the model should use as
little data processing possible.
The proposed approach to tackle these challenges uses
a modified loss-function and decision-making process to
reflect the penalties of false-positives (see Figure 1) together
with the distillation technique to improve inference speed
(see Figure 2).
3.0.1 Modified loss function and decision-making
Machine learning algorithms continue to update their pa-
rameters during the training phase towards the minimisa-
tion of some loss function. In supervised learning problems,
for which we have the ground truth labels associated with
the data, this means minimising the number of wrong
predictions over the entire training set.
Online detection with automatic process killing will stop
a process (and all child processes) if that process is deemed
malicious at any single point during execution, the model
predictions are not averaged across the entire execution
trace. If a benign process is running for 3 minutes and being
monitored every second it may be deemed malicious at 2
minutes 45 seconds but labelled benign the rest of the time,
an online process killing model will react to that single alert
whereas the offline model described in the previous section
would average out all predictions and label the process
malicious. This results in a dramatic increase in the false-
positive rate.
A neural network’s weights are updated during training
to minimise the prediction error across all samples in the
training set. Using the previous example of the 3-minute
benign process, 180 predictions (60 seconds * 3 minutes) are
made and only 1/180 is wrong. This feeds back a very small
loss to the machine learning model such that it may not
adjust its weights to eliminate the single wrong prediction
for that process at the risk of compromising other correct
predictions. For this reason we have proposed a modified
loss function to capture the problem posed by online detec-
tion.
The modified loss function takes inspiration from rein-
forcement learning. An offline model will use supervised
learning, taking a labelled dataset to guide the training of
the model to match as many of those labels correctly as
possible. Reinforcement learning uses rewards and penalties
from the model’s environment. In reinforcement learning,
loss functions are replaced by reward functions which up-
date the neural network weights to reinforce model outputs
that lead to higher rewards and discourage model outputs
that lead to lower rewards.
In the case of online malware detection, we make two
assumptions that underpin the new loss function:
A: True positives are more useful the earlier in the
process that they occur
B: False positives are undesirable
Assumption A is true if we assume that the longer mal-
ware executes, the more chance of greater damage. Assump-
tion B is defined in contrast to Assumption A; if a benign
word-processing program is being used, a false positive one
second into the program opening is just as unhelpful as a
false positive 3 hours into the program running.
Formally the loss function for N samples where yi is the
label for sample i ofN , pi is the model prediction for sample
i, and ti is the execution time left for sample i, loss L is:
1
N
N∑
i=1
((pi − ti)2 + bpie · (1− ti) + yi · 1
ti + 1
) (1)
The first term of the modified loss function (1) is the
mean squared error of the model prediction, the second term
5penalises any false positive at a flat rate and the last term
scales the loss inversely proportional to the execution time
left of a process for a positive prediction.
Distinguishing malicious and benign processes is a bi-
nary detection problem. Outputs closer to 0 indicate that the
model believes the process to be benign, and outputs closer
to 1 indicate the the model believes the process malicious.
The default threshold to distinguish malicious and benign
samples is 0.5 but this can be adjusted to reduce the chances
of throwing a false positive. Section 4.3 details the results
of implementing the modified loss function and altering the
decision boundary.
3.0.2 Killing malicious processes as early as possible
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) were developed to en-
able neural networks to classify time-series data. Their
usefulness was limited until 1997 when Schmidhuber and
Hochreiter [25] developed the Long-Short Term Memory
(LSTM) cell which made use of gating mechanisms, enabling
RNNs to learn over longer time series without the gradients
exploding or vanishing. Dynamic behavioural data is time-
series data and RNNs (using LSTM or Gated Recurrent
Unit Cells) have shown good detection accuracy for various
malware detection and classification tasks (e.g. [6], [26],
[27], [28]). Chung et al. [29] have subsequently developed
a variant of the LSTM cell, Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs),
which are computationally more efficient due to using one
fewer gating mechanism whilst generally maintaining the
accuracy of LSTMs on most datasets [30], which are the
RNN cells used in this paper.
RNNs have previously been used for accurate malware
detection, implying that they could work well for mali-
cious process detection, however, these neural networks
are computationally intensive both to train and when used
for inference. The inference time for a recurrent neural
network scales linearly with the window size of the data
it is analysing, and larger windows tend to lead to more
accurate predictions [6]. Ideally it would be possible to
achieve the accuracy of detection of an RNN with a much
smaller model. This paper proposes and evaluates the use
of distillation to achieve this.
Distillation was first proposed by Hinton, Vinyals and
Dean [22] as a means to reducing the computational com-
plexity of ensemble machine learning models. One common
way to improve the accuracy of a machine learning-based
system is to combine the predictions of multiple models
together. These models often work better together than
individually but running multiple models increases com-
putational cost. Distillation trains an additional model to
predict the result of the ensemble (rather than the ground
truth labels) in order to mimic their strengths. Models will
typically output a set of logits for a multi-class classification
problem or a value between 0 and 1 for a binary classifi-
cation problem which gives nuance to the predictions and
can enables the model used for the distillation to learn more
than it would from the ground truth labels. Sometimes the
distilled model outperforms the original ensemble [22].
Here we use a Random Forest to distil the findings of
the RNN. Carlin et al. [14] found that Random Forests gave
the best balance between accurate prediction and inference
speed in a comparison of 23 machine learning algorithms.
Random Forests cannot process time-series data nor can
they output non-integer values meaning they cannot in-
gest the same data as the RNNs nor predict the values
between 0 and 1 output by the model. Instead of the full
window of data the Random Forest will just see the most
recent captured data (see Figures 1 and 2). This may seem
counter-intuitive but Celik and McDaniel [24] found that
in a number of security applications (including classifying
malware into families) distillation could be used to train
models with partial information when compared with the
full models from which they are distilled. Instead of values
between 0 and 1, the Random Forest will be trained to mimic
the behaviour of the malware with the adjusted decision
threshold to mitigate the chances of false positives. The
results of the distillation experiments are in Section 4.4.
3.1 Features
A variety of features have been used for dynamic malware
detection which can be used to inform the choice for ma-
licious process detection. The fundamental difference being
that the features collected for dynamic malware detection
are usually observing the activity for an entire virtual ma-
chine, whether that is API calls, network traffic or hardware
performance counters. Data collection for a machine may be
faster than ascribing the data to the individual processes that
created it, which is one reason we have chosen to use ma-
chine activity metrics rather than API hooking. API hooking
collects the data point first and then ascribes it to a process
which costs processing time, and potentially therefore time
during which malware is causing damage. Sun et al.’s work
[7] on process classification has indicated that real-time data
collection using API hooks can be slow and this paper seeks
to minimise data collection and inference time to limit the
potential damage inflicted by malicious processes.
The data collected are numeric machine activity metrics.
These continuous data can represent a wider range of states
in fewer features than discrete events such as API calls
are able to and are collected every second as the process
executes. 26 features are used, these were dictated by the
attributes available using the Psutil [31] python library,
which enables fast data collection inspecting each running
process. The machine activity metrics collected are listed in
Table 1
Feature normalisation is necessary for RNNs to avoid
over-weighting features with higher absolute values. The
test, train and validation sets (x) are all normalised by
subtracting the mean (µ) and dividing by the standard
deviation (σ) of each feature in the training set: x−µσ . This
sets the range of input values largely between -1 and 1 for
all input features, avoiding the potential for some features
to be weighted more important than others during training
purely due to the scalar values of those features.
3.2 Environment
The environment describes the machine used to test the pro-
posed model. The following experiments were conducted
using a virtual machine (VM) running with Cuckoo Sand-
box [32] for ease of collecting data and restarting between
experiments. To emulate the capabilities of a typical ma-
chine, we took the modal hardware attributes of the top 10
6Category
CPU use (%) system level user level
Memory use
(bytes)
total physical
(non-
swapped)
swap
Child
processes
count maximum
process ID
number of
threads
I/O
operation
bytes on
disk (bytes)
read write non-read-
write I/O
operations
I/O
operation
count on
disk
read write non-read-
write I/O
operations
Priority process
priority
I/O process
priority
Misc. number of
command
line
arguments
passed to
process
number of
handles
being used
by process
Time
(seconds)
Time since
process start
Network
Packets
TCP packet
count
UDP packet
count
Network
Other
number of
connections
currently
open
statuses of
the ports
opened by
the process
(4 statuses)
TABLE 1
26 features used by RNN model: 22 features + 4 port status values
“best seller” laptops according to a popular internet vendor
[33], and used these attributes to set up the machine. This
resulted in a VM with 4GB RAM, 128GB Storage and dual-
core processing running Windows 7 64-bit. Though new PC
laptops are typically packaged with Windows 10, Windows
7 is still the most widely used operating system globally
[21].
In typical machine use, multiple applications run simul-
taneously. This is not reflected by behavioural malware anal-
ysis research in which which samples are injected individu-
ally to a virtual machine for observation. The environment
used for the following experiments launches multiple appli-
cations on the same machine at slightly staggered intervals
as if a user were opening them. Each malware is launched
with a manageable number (1-3) and a larger number (3-35)
of applications. Most of these applications will be benign but
some malware are randomly chosen to run simultaneously
with the benignware. Each application may launch multiple
processes, causing more than 35 processes to run at once.
From the existing run-time analysis literature only Sun et
al. [7] run multiple applications at the same time, with
a maximum of 5 running simultaneously. We could not
find up to date user data on the number of simultaneous
applications running on a typical desktop, so have chosen
to launch up to 36 applications (35 benign + 1 malicious) at
once, which is the largest number of simultaneous apps for
run-time data collection to date.
3.3 Evaluation metrics
Fig. 3. Scenario A: Process A which spawns child processes B and C is
killed at time t = 5
Fig. 4. Scenario B: Process A which spawns child processes B and C is
killed at time t = 1
The evaluation metrics used for machine learning mod-
els that do not interact with their environment are not
appropriate for a model which kills processes and thus alters
its environment. Rather than averaging predictions over the
entire execution trace, it is preferable that a benign process
is never labelled malicious (thus avoiding it being killed).
Malicious processes should be killed and killed as early
as possible to reduce the opportunities for damage to the
endpoint; for example scenario B (Fig. 4) is preferable to
scenario A (Fig. 3).
The malware evaluation metric cascades positive detec-
tions to child processes at the time they are applied and the
success of the model is determined by the shortest malware
execution time per process (parent and child processes)
prevented from executing. In Figures 3 and 4 if malicious
process A would execute for 120 seconds undisturbed, B for
30 and C for 20 seconds, scenario A gives a FNR over time
of 5+4+4120+30+20 = 7.65% whilst Scenario B gives a FNR over
time of 1+0+0120+30+20 = 0.58%.
The benignware evaluation metric is measured by the
lowest false positive rate as it is not necessarily preferable
to kill a benign program after 10 minutes than after 1 second
depending on what the user is doing.
The metric used to capture both error in malicious and
benign detection is the mean of the false positive rate (FPR)
and the false negative rate over time (FNR over time). The
mean FPR, FNR over time will be denoted by (FPR + FNR
over time) / 2.
74 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Dataset
The software samples used in this paper are all Windows
portable executables. These are the most commonly seen file
types submitted to VirusTotal [34], a free malware analysis
service. We use 3,603 benign and 2,876 malicious samples,
with 3,313 for training and validation and 3,946 for testing,
which is consistent with previous run-time detection dataset
sizes ( [19] uses 168 malicious, 370 benign; [15] uses over 100
each benign and malicious; [20] uses 1,087 malicious and 467
benign; [7] uses 9,115 malicious, 877 benign).
Overall there are 57,981 behavioural traces of processes
in the training, testing and validation datasets. The benign
samples comprise files from VirusTotal [35], from free soft-
ware websites (later verified as benign with VirusTotal), and
from a fresh Windows 7 installation. The malicious samples
were collected from two different VirusShare [36] reposito-
ries. The dataset is split in half with the malicious samples
in the test set coming from the more recent VirusShare
repository, and those in the training set from the earlier
repository. This is to increase the chances of simulating a real
deployment scenario in which the malware tested contain
new functionality by comparison with those in the training
set.
The training and validation sets are created from the
same set of samples, but the sets of behavioural traces in the
benign and validation sets are mutually exclusive. The test
set is generated from a distinct set of benign and malicious
applications.
In practice a user will launch the same benign applica-
tion again and again. The proportion of benign applications
which are completely new to the system will only represent
a small proportion of all benign applications executed due
to the repeated use of installed applications (e.g. browsers,
email clients, word processors). Though the same applica-
tions are used again and again, their behavioural traces may
be slightly different, such that a detection model may have
seen a behavioural trace for application ‘X’ before but has
not seen it behave in the specific way it is acting now. This
is analogous to a model which has learned how to recognise
objects from images, but it may not have seen a learned
object from a particular perspective or angle before.
The validation set represents this group of use cases. To
generate the validation set, samples from the training set are
run again to generate new unseen behavioural traces. There
is increased likelihood that benignware executing will have
been seen before but that the malware will be new as known
malware samples are filtered out by signature-based anti-
virus once they are known to the malware community. This
makes the test set malware detection rate and the validation
set benignware detection rate important metrics.
Data collection used the Psutil [31] python library to col-
lect machine activity data for running processes and to kill
those processes deemed malicious. The RNN and Random
Forests were implemented using the Pytorch [37] and Scikit-
Learn [38] python libraries respectively. The model runs
with high priority to make sure the polling is maintained
when compute resources are scarce.
Hyperparamter Possible values
hidden neurons [50-5000]
depth [1, 2, 3]
batch size 64, 128, 256
epochs [1 - 200]
dropout rate [0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5]
window size [1 - 30]
TABLE 2
Hyperparameter search space
4.2 Offline detection of malicious processes
Though this paper is concerned with online detection, here
we provide the results for offline detection of malicious
processes using the same train, validation and test datasets
as a benchmark.
Recurrent neural networks, like any neural network, can
be highly sensitive to the hyperparameters selected prior to
training. These include the number of neurons (or GRU cells
in this case) in the hidden layers and the number of hidden
layers. The selection of hyperparamters may be conducted
manually but it can also be automated, which is preferred if
human resources are not available and if the model will be
retrained to incorporate information about new malware in
the future. Based on Bergstra and Bengio’s [39] findings that
a random search of the possible set of parameters tends to
find higher-accuracy models more quickly by comparison to
grid-based searches, a random search was used to find the
optimal set of hyperparameters from the search space listed
in Table 2.
The hyperparameters in table 2 are as follows: hidden
neurons refers to the number of GRU cells in each hidden
layer; the depth refers to the number of hidden layers in
the neural network; the batch size indicates the number of
samples predicted by the model between weight updates
and the epochs designate the number of times the model
will be exposed to the entire dataset; the dropout rate is
a regularisation technique first proposed by Srivastava et
al. [40] to reduce the chance of model overfitting, the rate
is the proportion of neurons randomly turned “off” (set to
an activation of 0) during training; the window size gives
the length of historical data for each process visible to the
model. For example a window size of 5 will allow the model
to see the current set of features and the features at the 4
previous time-steps. The data used here is captured every
second such that a window size of 5 corresponds to the
model being able to see the machine activity metrics from 4,
3, 2, and 1 seconds ago as well as the current metrics. For
reproducibility, the loss function used to train the model was
mean squared error and the weight update algorithm was
Adam [41].
The model is trained using a random selection of 50,000
malicious and 50,000 benign windows of process activity.
The validation set is highly imbalanced due to the inten-
tional setup of the experiment with 1 - 35 benign processes
running with just 1 - 2 malicious processes running to mimic
the likely proportions of benign and malicious software
running on a machine where the majority of applications
will be benign. Due to the unbalanced validation set, here
the best model is the one that has the lowest mean false
positive and false negative rate. The hyperparameters of the
best-performing model are detailed in Table 3. The model
8Hyperparamter Value
hidden neurons 3076
depth 1
batch size 256
epochs 127
dropout rate 0
window size 12
loss function mean squared error
weight update rule Adam [41]
recurrent unit GRU cell
TABLE 3
Hyperparameters of the model giving the lowest mean false-positive
and false-negative rates
Dataset Acc. (%) FPR (%) FNR (%)
Training 98.01 2.19 1.36
Validation 88.55 8.72 31.31
Test 77.58 24.18 16.81
TABLE 4
Accuracy (Acc.), false positive (FPR) and false negative rates (FNR) for
the training, validation and test sets using the offline model
prediction for a given process is determined by taking the
mean prediction across all windows. The results on the
training, validation and test sets are in Table 4.
These results indicate the challenge of detecting indi-
vidual malicious processes by comparison with malicious
applications overall. Our previous work used the same set of
samples and was able to achieve 96.01% detection accuracy
on the test set with 3.17% and 4.72% false positive and false
negative rates respectively using a recurrent neural network
by observing the overall behaviour of the virtual machine
when each sample ran independently. Run-time malware
process detection cannot observe the overall impact of an
application on a machine as it is only able to see the
partial execution trace up to that point in time and possibly
only a part of the overall application behaviour if multiple
processes comprise the application.
4.3 Online detection with automatic process killing
Online detection of malicious processes is only useful if it
can prevent the damage caused by malware. Some mal-
ware will begin causing damage to an endpoint almost
immediately and in that case automatic responses present
the quickest and most reliable way to prevent damage.
Prevention is preferable to an alert after the event because
saves the resources necessary to recover from an attack. A
human could respond to run-time alerts but this would
require a human to be present and to be able to react
quickly to mitigate damage. Human-in-the loop systems
are vulnerable to flooding attacks which can slow down
response times significantly and thus potentially allow more
damage to take place in the delay.
Table 5 shows the changes in false positive and false
negative rates in moving from an offline to an online model.
There is a dramatic increase in false positives and a fall
in false negatives, and this result is not surprising. As
detailed previously in Section 3.0.1, the mean squared error
loss function is trying to minimise the number of wrong
predictions over the entire training set and does not dis-
criminate between false positives and false negatives even
though a false positive results in a process being terminated
Dataset Validation data
Acc. (%) FPR (%) FNR (%)
Offline 88.55 8.72 31.31
Offline
model
applied
online
48.87 53.16 3.95
Test data
Acc. (%) FPR (%) FNR (%)
Offline 77.58 24.18 16.81
Offline
model
applied
online
38.72 72.00 2.56
TABLE 5
Change in accuracy (Acc.), false postive rate (FPR) and false negative
rate (FNR) on validation and test datasets used for offline detection for
online detection with automatic process killing
Hyperparamter Offline model
value
Online model value
hidden
neurons
3076 2021
depth 1 1
batch size 256 256
epochs 127 24
dropout rate 0 0
window size 12 3
loss function Mean sq. error Modified loss function
weight
update rule
Adam [41] Adam [41]
recurrent unit GRU cell GRU cell
TABLE 6
Hyperparameters of the model giving the lowest total false-positive and
false-negative rates
permanently, whilst a false negative gives the model the
chance to reclassify the process at the next time-step.
The modified loss function introduced in Section 3.0.1
is used to train a new model with the goal to reduce the
false positive rate. Using the modified loss function, another
random search of hyperparameters gives the best model
for the new loss function. The best model is the one that
has the lowest mean score for false positive rate and the
quickest true positive decisions made, as detailed above in
Section 3.3. This is necessary in case the new model finds a
longer or shorter window of data helpful for example. The
hyperparamters of the new RNN using the modified loss
function are given in table 6, presented together with the
offline model values for ease of comparison. Other than the
loss function, 3 of 6 hyperparameters remain unchanged.
The number of hidden neurons has reduced by more than
one third and the window size has quartered. The online
model also took far fewer epochs to train.
The decision threshold for deeming a process malicious
is a value between 0 (benign) and 1 (malicious), with a
default value of 0.5. This threshold can be adjusted to further
reduce the chances of a false positive classification. Figure 5
shows how the false positive rate and the false negative
rate over time are impacted by altering the threshold value
between 0.5 and 1.
The lowest mean false positive rate and false negative
rate across time used a threshold of 0.98. As Figure 5
illustrates, using the adjusted loss function gives a lower
false positive rate at all time-steps. Table 7 reports the accu-
9Fig. 5. False positive rate (FPR), false negative rate over time (FNR
over time), and the mean FPR and FNR over time for varying thresholds
between 0.5 and 1
Dataset Acc. (%) FPR (%) FNR
over
time (%)
(FPR +
FNR over
time) / 2
Validation 93.62 4.23 21.59 13.21
Test 69.93 28.12 33.82 32.15
TABLE 7
Accuracy, false positive and false negative rates over time for the
validation and test sets using an online model with automatic process
killing. This model is trained with the modified loss function and uses a
decision threshold of 0.98
racy metrics for the validation and test sets. The modified
loss function RNN with a threshold adjustment has seen a
reduction of false positives from 72.00% of all unseen benign
samples to 28.12% percent. This still represents a high false
positive rate for unseen benign applications. Distilling the
RNN into a secondary (Random Forest) model is intended
to both reduce the computational costs of running the RNN
as well as emphasising the gravity of false positives.
4.4 Distilled real-time detection and automatic process
killing
Distilling a machine learning model into another model
is typically used to reduce the computational complexity
during inference, but can sometimes lead to improvements
in accuracy beyond the original model [22].
Recurrent neural networks are computationally inten-
sive as the number of neurons in a hidden layer are scaled
by the number of time-steps used by the model. The online
model proposed in the previous Section (4.3) makes 18,190
calculations per prediction during inference. Beyond the
computational requirements of the RNN there are other
steps that delay inference or occupy more memory than
the raw machine activity metrics being collected from each
process. Carlin et al. [14] found that a Random Forest gave
the best trade off between accuracy and cost of inference.
The following table (Table 8) outlines the additional pro-
cessing and memory requirements required for an RNN by
comparison with a Random Forest. Each of the processing
requirements in Table 8 takes some time. In this paper we
are concerned with fast-acting malware and quick responses
such that time delays should be minimised.
Table 9 details the accuracy scores for the three models
presented in this paper:
1 the offline model trained with a normal (mean-
squared error) loss function using a decision thresh-
old of 0.5 and applied to online detection with auto-
matic process killing
RNN requires for inference
but Random Forest does
not
Memory or processing cost
The RNN uses a sequence
equivalent to the window
size must be stored for each
process this requires
tracking each process in
order to align data at each
time-step
memory requirement scales
linearly with window size;
processing cost to align new
data with existing data
RNN data must be
normalised using the mean
and standard deviations of
the training data
memory requirement to
store training data means
and standard deviations (2 *
number of features * bytes
per datum); processing
requirement O(number of
features) to calculate
normalised values
RNN outputs a value
between 0 and 1 which must
be converted into a decision,
but the Random Forest
outputs 0 or 1 as default
very small processing cost of
O(number of samples in
batch)
TABLE 8
Disadvantages of a recurrent neural network by comparison with a
Random Forest with respect to processing requirements at inference
4 the online model trained with the modified loss
function using a threshold selected for optimal per-
formance on the validation set
5 the distilled random forest trained from the online
model (Model 4)
For comparison we have added three additional models:
2 the offline model trained with an adjusted deci-
sion threshold selected for optimal performance on
the validation set in online detection with process
killing
3 the online model trained with a modified loss func-
tion using a threshold of 0.5
6 a Random Forest model trained directly from the
training data
Model 4 (online model) departs from model 1 (offline
model) in two respects: the loss function and the decision
threshold. Models 2 and 4 are included to illustrate the
separate impacts of these two changes. Both the online and
offline models see a large fall in the false positive rate when
we allow the “optimal” decision thresholds to be used (0.99
and 0.98 respectively), these thresholds being determined
be the mean FPR and FNR over time. On both the test
and validation sets, however, Model 4 (online model with
adjusted threshold + modified loss function) achieves the
lowest FPR indicating that the threshold alone does not
account for the fall in FPR.
Model 6 is included to show that we cannot achieve the
same results as by simply training a Random Forest in the
first place from the training data. The distilled random forest
(Model 5) maintains a low false positive rate on completely
unseen benign applications of 4.76% compared with 30.89%
for Model 6. Even though Model 6 has a lower mean FPR
and FNR over time, but 30% of new benign application’s
processes and 12% of known benign application’s processes
are terminated automatically.
The distilled model does not achieve the lowest (FPR +
FNR over time) / 2 but it is the only model to kill less than
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Dataset Model
#
Model Acc. (%) FPR (%) FNR (%) FPR across
time (%)
FNR across
time (%)
(FPR +
FNR across
time) / 2
Val. 1 Offline model
(θ=0.5)
48.87 53.16 3.95 56.86 4.67 30.4
Val. 2 Offline model
(best θ=0.99)
78.19 22.42 14.47 22.84 13.5 18.66
Val. 3 Online model
(θ=0.5)
55.13 44.4 10.13 49.41 7.16 29.77
Val. 4 Online model
(best θ=0.98)
93.62 4.23 21.87 4.55 21.59 13.21
Val. 5 Distilled RF
model
87.81 2.59 92.62 2.93 89.63 47.78
Val. 6 RF trained
directly from data
87.15 12.32 26.23 10.91 29.02 18.57
Test 1 Offline model
(θ=0.5)
38.72 72.0 2.56 74.21 3.18 38.38
Test 2 Offline model
(best θ=0.99)
61.2 43.28 10.69 44.4 13.66 27.54
Test 3 Online model
(θ=0.5)
39.39 70.27 3.28 73.31 3.46s 38.3
Test 4 Online model
(best θ=0.98)
69.93 28.12 35.06 29.24 33.82 32.15
Test 5 Distilled RF
model
84.35 4.76 71.97 5.11 62.9 38.54
Test 6 RF trained
directly from data
70.08 30.89 24.15 31.09 24.66 27.62
TABLE 9
Comparison of accuracy metrics for 6 models on the test and validation (val.) sets. 1. offline model used for online detection with default threshold
(θ) of 0.5. 2. offline model used for online detection with threshold optimised for validation set ((FPR + FNR across time) / 2), θ=0.99. 3. online
model with modified loss function using default θ=0.5. 4. online model with modified loss function and threshold optimised for validation set
accuracy ((FPR + FNR across time) / 2), θ=0.98. 5. distilled random forest from the online model modified loss function and optimise threshold. 6.
random forest trained directly from the raw training data.
25% of the unseen benign processes, its FPR being less than
5%. The distilled model kills 30% of unknown malicious
applications. Whilst this figure is low, it is still a significant
improvement on a random guess as the model simultane-
ously maintains a low false positive rate of 4.76%. Due to
the lack of labels for individual processes we cannot know
whether those processes killed are the ones causing the most
damage. Malware may invoke multiple processes in order
to achieve its goals but some of those may not be harmful to
the user such as processes which conduct reconnaissance to
collect non-sensitive information. 30% may be sufficient to
limit the damage to the endpoint.
To evaluate the tangible impact for a user, the next
Section (4.5) conducts a live real-time experiment to see the
damage caused with and without the random forest model
running.
4.5 Case Study: Ransomware damage
The labels provided for the malicious and benign samples
in this dataset are denoted at the application level. A sin-
gle application may invoke tens of processes and without
considerable manual reverse engineering effort, it is not
possible to determine which processes are causing damage
and which are not. Although we can say with confidence
that benign processes should not be killed and the processes
created by malicious applications can be killed without
causing damage, we do not know which malicious processes
are causing the (most) damage. It may be that malware runs
a number of processes for data exfiltration, but some of
these could be gathering data whilst one is responsible for
sending it back to the adversary. As long as the latter process
is killed, the malware’s capacity to cause damage is limited.
Ransomware is a the broad term given to malware that
prevents access to user data (often by encrypting files) and
holds the means for retrieving the data (usually a decryption
key) from the user until a ransom is paid. It is possible
to quantify the damage caused by ransomware using the
proportion of modified files as Scaife et al. [42] have done in
developing a ransomware detection system.
From 2000 VirusShare ransomware portable executables
it was possible to identify 158 which begin modifying files
within the first 30 seconds of execution and do not require
internet connection to do so. Some may argue that malware
will commonly wait for instructions from a C2 server before
carrying out the malicious payload but these 158 samples
indicate that malware exists which will begin causing prob-
lems for the used within seconds of being launched without
any such instruction. These are the types of malware that
the proposed model could have a significant impact on.
The 158 samples were executed for 60 seconds each
without the process killing model in place 3 times and
the average number of files modified recorded. The process
killing Random Forest model was then used to detect and
kill malicious processes. Across the 158 samples, the number
of modified files was reduced from 11,680 to 1,595; equiva-
lent to a reduction of 86.34% fewer files being compromised.
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5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Behavioural malware analysis research using machine learn-
ing regularly reports >95% classification accuracy. Though
useful for analysts, behavioural detection should be de-
ployed as part of endpoint defensive systems to leverage
the full benefits of a detection model. Dynamic analysis is
not typically used for endpoint protection because it takes
too long in data collection to deliver the quick verdicts
required for good user experience. Run-time detection on
the endpoint allows for observation of the full trace without
the user having to wait. However, run-time detection also
introduces the risk that malware will cause damage to
the endpoint. This risk requires that processes detected as
malicious are automatically killed as early as possible to
avoid harm.
The distilled Random Forest model presented in this
paper correctly identified 95.24% of unseen benign applica-
tions and was able to have a tangible impact on the damage
caused to a user by fast-acting ransomware, preventing
86.34% of the file corruption that took place without the
model running.
These results are encouraging but the false negative rate
remains high with only unseen 30% of malicious processes
being detected. Killing 30% of processes may be sufficient
to prevent the malicious payload being executed in many
cases but we cannot know this without process-level labels.
Future work will seek to improve the accuracy of the model
using more granular labels and further test the robustness
of the model under capacity strain:
• The precise accuracy of the model is difficult to calcu-
late without process-wise labelling of subprocesses.
Future work could train the model with individually
labelled processes. This is likely to improve accuracy
results and give a better indication of how much
damage is being prevented.
• In these experiments, up to 36 applications were
running at once with a maximum of 95 processes
being measured and classified simultaneously. Fu-
ture experiments should test the robustness and
dependability of this model to discover if there is
a capacity limit after which accuracy severely dimin-
ishes. Running an even higher number of processes
may, for example, slow down the data collection so
much that the malware is able to inflict more damage
during the processing time.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Behavioural malware detection is a well-established re-
search field with little translation into models for run-time
behavioural detection, though run-time detection enables us
to move from analysis post-attack to prevention of damage
caused by malware. In this paper we have demonstrated
that using a modified loss function and decision threshold
to train a recurrent neural network, the increased likelihood
of false positives for automatic process killing can be miti-
gated.
The distilled model presented in this paper captured
adversity to false positives whilst demonstrating a tangi-
ble benefit to users in the case of fast-acting ransomware,
reducing the number of files encrypted by 86.34%.
The distilled model does not yet achieve the detection ac-
curacies of state of the art offline behavioural analysis mod-
els, but these models typically use the full post-execution
trace of malicious behaviour. Delaying classification until
post-execution negates the principal advantages of run-time
detection. However, the proposed model presents an initial
step towards a fully automated endpoint protection model
which becomes increasingly necessary as adversaries be-
come more and more motivated to evade offline automated
detection tools.
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